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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DALE S. PIERRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 16169

LAWRENCE MORRIS, as Warden of
the Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant petitioned for a post-conviction writ
of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court to
which respondent moved to dismiss.

The Honorable James S.

Sawaya granted respondent's motion and dismissed the
petition with prejudice.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\·IER COURT

The Court below heard oral arguments on the
respondent's motion to dismiss and thereafter granted the
motion on November 30, 1978, and also denied appellant's
motion for a stay of execution.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgments
and order of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 15, 1974, appellant was found guilty
by a jury of three counts of murder in the first degree
and two counts of aggravated robbery.

The gruesome facts

surrounding the crimes were previously recited to this
Court on appellant's and his co-defendant's direct appeals in
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977); and State v.
Andrews, 572 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977).

See also the Statement·

of Facts in the State of Utah's brief in opposition to
appellant's petition for certiorari in Pierre v. State,
United States Supreme Court No.

77-6583, cert. denied, October

2, 1978, which is part of the record on appeal in the
instant case.
After a bifurcated sentencing hearing, the jury
determined that appellant's case was a proper case for the
imposition of the death penalty, and appellant was
sentenced to death by shooting at the Utah State Prison.
Appellant and his co-defendant took direct appeals
to the Utah Supreme Court ruising constitutional challenges
to their convictions and sentences.

This Court subsequently

affirmc=ci the convictions anc1 sentences in State _':'_.:__!'_ierre,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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supra, and State v. Andrews, supra.

Motions for a rehearing

of the appeals were made by appellant and his co-defendant
without supporting authorities, and these motions were
subsequently denied by this Court.
On or about April

14, 1978, appellant petitioned

the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari and
the State filed a brief in opposition to his petition.
(These pleadings were made part of

proceedings before Judge

Sawaya and are also part of the record on appeal in the
instant case).

On October 2, 1978, the petition for

writ of certiorari was denied by the high court.
On or about November 28, 1978, appellant filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial
District Court, and also applien for a stay of his execution
which was then set for December 7, 1978.

Again, he raised

numerous constitutional challenqes to his conviction and
sentence.

Significantly, in his petition, appellant also

sought an order from the court granting him authority to
obtain subpoenas in forma pauoeJis for witnesses and
documents necessary to prove the facts alleged in his
petition and for an additional sixty days after the
completion o: any hearing on his petition to brief the
issues of law raised in his pPtition.

The clear implication

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of these requests is that petitioner had neither ascertained
the facts nor the controlling law to support his legal claims
when he filed his petition despite the fact that he had had
approximately one year to do so from the date his conviction
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.
Accordingly, respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the petition on November 29, 1978, alleging that (1)
petitioner could not, by writ of habeas corpus, raise issues
that were or could have been raised in his direct appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court;

(2) prosecutorial discretion in

charging a capital felony is permissible under recent rulings
of the United States Supreme Court; and (3) all issues
raised by petitioner were addressed in prior pleadings submitted by the State in prior proceedings and adequately
dispose of petitioner's issues on the merits.

(Such pleadings

were annexed to respondent's motion to dismiss).
Respondent's motion to dismiss and appellant's
application for a stay of execution came on for hearing on
No\·ember 30, 1978.

Appellant expressed no objection to the

hearing proceeding on November 30th (Hearing Transcript of
November 30, 1978, at 3, 5).

After full argument, Judge

Sawaya commented from the bench that he had reviev1ed the
Utah Supreme Court's rulings on appellant's and his codefendant's direct appeals, und said,

"it seems to mP

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that it [the cases] covers nearly every issue that could
possibly be raised in a capital case except the one • • •
on the question of whether or not the death sentence ia belaq
imposed in a fair manner."
30, 1978, at 32).

(Hearing Transcript of llovellber

However, on that latter issue, Judge

Sawaya commented as follows:
One thing that disturbs me is the fact
that, regardless of our feeling about capital
punishment, it seems that what you [appellants]
are urging is that in any situation where an
individual is convicted and sentenced to death
I guess we should wait over a few years period and
see whether or not there are others that are so
convicted and sentenced and then if it is
not being imposed on an equal pattern then the
man should have a stay and should have a new
trial or something. I'm not sure that I buy
th,,t theory but I'm willing to give it SOllie
consideration. I'm not sure that I have a right
to even voice an opinion about it. The question
is whether or not there is a new issue that
should be considered and the only one that
I can see is the one involving prosecutorial
discretion as it affects the imposition of
the death penalty so I'll consider it and I'll
have you a ruling probably about noon today.
(T.

32).

It should be noted that earlier in the hearing, respondent
referred the court to his legal analysis of the issue of
prosecutorial discretion in charging capital offenses
contained at pages six and seven of his memorandum in support
of his motion to dismiss, and argued that the issue was one
that could be disposed of as a matter of law because the
claim had previously been raised to and rejected by the
United States supreme Court in prior capital cases (T.26).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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Later on November 30, 1978, Judge Sawaya issued

a memorandum decision granting respondent's

mo~ion

to dismiss

and concluding as follows:

It is the opinion of the Court that the
Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
herein raised no issue of fact or law material
to determination of the legality and constitutionality of the conviction, confinement
or sentence of the Petitioner which were not
raised or could not have been raised on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
(R.ll8).
He also signed an order on November 30, 1978, granting
respondent's motion which read as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent's
motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is granted on the
ground that all issues raised in petitioner's
petition were known or should have been known
at the time petitioner took his direct appeal
from his conviction to the Utah Supreme Court,
and all issues either were raised or could have
been raised•on that appeal, and habeas corpus
may not be used to relitigate appealed issues
or to raise issues which could have been raised
on appeal. Maguire v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696 (Utah 19761
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968
(1968); and Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284,
431 P.2d 121 (1967). Accordingly, petitioner's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed
with prejudice, and petitioner's application for
a stay of execution is denied.
(R. 119-120).
Finally,

o~

December 4, 1978, Judge Sawaya entered

the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. No developments of fact or law material
to the determination of the legality and
constitutionality of the conviction and
sentence of the Petitioner herein have occurred
since the filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court and that Court's decision
on that appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.
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2. All the issues regarding the
constitutionality of the processes for
death sentences under Utah law, the
constitutionality of the death sentence in
Petitioner's case, and the effect of any
alleged prejudicial publicity or influences
on Petitioner's trial which are raised or
could have been raised by this Petition
are the same issues that Petitioner raised
in his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court.
3. Petitioner's claim that Utah's
death penalty law is being applied
arbitrarily and discriminatorily fails
to state a claim on which relief could be
granted or on which a hearing need be held.
Moreover, petitioner could and should have
raised such issue on direct appeal.
4. Constitutional issues identical to
those raised and decided on direct appeal
cannot be raised again in collateral
proceedings.
5. Constitutional challenges to the
pattern of application of a crimin~l statute
or the excessiveness of a criminal sentence
which were not but could have been raised
through collateral proceedings.
(R. 124-125).
From the above rulings, appellant now brings this

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Two cases currently pending before this Court,
Pierre v. Morris, Sup. Ct. No. 16169 (the instant case),
and Andrews v. Morris, Sup. Ct. No. 16168, are so closely
related to one another that special consideration by this
Court would seem to be warranted.

In an attempt to

further judicial efficiency without sacrificing justice
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and fairness, respondent has structured his brief in the
instant case in such a fashion as to incorporate by
reference much of the material included in respondent's
brief in Andrews v.

Morris.

Given the similarity of the

issues raised by the appellants in the two cases, respondent
feels that the quality of legal argument is not sacrificed
by this procedure.

Counsel for appellant Pierre have been

served with copies of the brief of respondent in Andrews v.
Morris.
Most importantly, respondent urges the Court to
read the brief of respondent in Andrews v. Morris before
reading the brief of respondent in the instant case.

In

this sequence, the arguments made by respondent will be
presented in a clear, logical order.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INVOKED A
DOCTRINE OF WAIVER THAT IS UNIQUE TO
POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS CASES AND
CORRECTLY DISMISSED ISSUES THAT COULD
OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT
APPEAL OF APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
IV.,~.,

As discussed in detail in Point

issues raised by a post-conviction habeas corpus petitioner
that could or should have been raised in a direct appeal
from his conviction may not be raised in a post-conviction
petition for writ of habeas corpus.

This result is

obtained through the use of a doctrine of waiver that has
historically been enforced by the Utah courts by means
of case law and special rules of procedure (Rule 65B(i),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) that limit the availability
of the writ.

Without overcoming the initial hurdle of

showing that the issues raised in a post-conviction
petition could not have been raised on direct appeal, a
petitioner's claims are the proper subjects of a motion
to dismiss as a matter of law for failure to state a
claim as set forth in Rule 65B(i).

Respondent submits

that appellant's petition in Third District Court was
fatally defecti\c for the reasons that

(J)

it attempted

to raise issues that had been raisrd previously in the
direct appeal of appellant's conviction,

(2) it attempted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to raise issues that could or should have been raised in
that appeal and (3) it raised issues that could be disposed
of as a matter of law pursuant to the authority of the
Third District Court.

Appellant's efforts to remove

issues from the scope of the lower court's ruling are
unpersuasive for the reasons which follow.
A.

APPELLANT MAY NOT SIMPLY RE-FRANE
ISSUES THAT WERE DECIDED ON DIRECT
APPEAL AND CHARACTERIZE THEH AS A
NOVEL, NEWLY-DISCOVERED BASIS FOR
A POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS.
Appellant summarizes four categories of issues
that assertedly form the basis for his Third District Court
petition, the firstofwhich includes "issues

raised in

appellant's petition (which) resulted from this court's
decision in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977)".
Brief of appellant at 4.

Respondent submits that rather

than arising from this Court's decision in Pierre (and,
therefore according to appellant, impossible to include
as part of the direct appeal itselt), the "new issues"
are merely restatements of the old jssues with additional
focus on the particular aspects of

tho~;e

highlighted by this Court's opinion.

old issues

An attempt to simply

re-frame old issues should be dismissl'd under the
authority of Utah statute and case law w!Jich prevents the
relitigation
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
petitioner.
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Rule 65B(i)(2)

requires that a petitioner state

whether the issues raised in the instant petition have been
previously litigated in "a prior habeas corpus or other
similar proceeding."

While this section is directed at

collateral proceedings rather than a direct appeal, the policy
of attempting to preclude relitigation of the same issues is
clear.

Moreover, Rule 65B(i) (2) also requires the petitioner

to state whether he took an appeal and, if so, identify the
appellate proceedings and state the results thereof.

The

clear purpose of this requirement is to aid courts in
determining the applicability of the waiver doctrine
established by this Court in case law.

The situation occurring

in the instant case is disposed of by that Utah case law.
Numerous cases have held that a habeas corpus petitioner
may not relitigate issues that he raised on direct appeal from
his conviction.

See,~, Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696

(Utah 1977); Oniskor v. Smith, 540 P.2d 519 (Utah 1975).
The strong state policy of avoiding duplicative litigation
should prevent appellant from bootstrapping from old
issues to "new issues" by means of semantical manipulation.
A review of the issues raised by appellant in this first
category reveals their true nature and their vulnerability
to the above-discussed

waiver doctrine.

At page 5 of his brief, appellant states

tha~

essentially five issues arose out of this Court's decision
(l) "discretion

that the

:__;·-,n ten~ intJ authority has in imposing the death penalty,"
( 2)

"tile

. .
t.1on of· the aggravating
nec·d for c;peclfl<'il

Sponsoredtby_l the
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

, 1 1 , • : 1.c;

ll

(3)

quidanc~ qiven to the sentencing authority in

"the

reaching the decision of whether or not to impose the
death penalty,"

(4) "the

nature and s;cope of appellate

review in capital cases," and ( 5)

"Issues

with respect to

the burden of proof to be applied at the sentencing phase."
Issues (1),

(3),

(4), and (5) were disposed of by this Court's

opinion in Pierre.
Issue

number (1), discretion of the sentencing

authority, was raised in Point I of appellant's original
(as opposed to his Amended Brief filed some time later
with the Court), Brief in his direct appeal (Exh. "A") wherein
appellant states:

"However, at the time of sentencing the

judge or jury is left with complete discretion to decide
whether to impose the death sentence."

Appellant

argued this point in his brief and the opinion of Justice
Wilkins in Pierre expressly dismissed the merits of the
It is fair to state that while the opinion of

argument.

Justice Wilkins in Pierre focused on the issues raised by
appellant in that case, the opinion was sufficiently
t~oro~gh

in

deali~g ~ith

all the issues concerning Utah's

death penalty that it disposed of any subtle nuances
deriveJ fr"-rt the original arguments of appellant.
Issue number

(3), ']Uidance given to the sentencing

authority, is a rec';otatc;l\l'nt upon

c1

restiltCTn':.>nt of an old
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issue.

It is duplicative of issue number (1), above, and is

also dealt with by this Court's opinion in Pierre.
Issue number (4), the nature and scope of
appellate review in capital cases, was raised by appellant
in Point I of his Amended Brief (Exh."B"). Again, this
issue was disposed of by the opinion on direct appeal.
Issue number (5), the burden of proof at the
sentencing phase, appeared as Point XII of appellant's
Amended Brief.

At the

risk of

soundinq repetitive,

this claim was also decided on direct appeal.
The writ of habeas corpus may not be used to serve
as a second appeal.

Oniskor v. Smith, supra.

The

instant case is a prime example of the reasons behind
cases like Oniskor.

This Court should not be

required to re-examine old issues that it has previously
addressed simply because an unsuccessful appellant is
dissatisfied with the Court's opinion or decides that he
subsequently has formulated another, hopefully more
?ersuasive, Hay o£' re-arguing the sa-ne point.

Judicial

''conomy demands that appellate courts assume this posture
with regard to issues previously litigated.
Issue number

(2), the specification of aggravating

circumstwnces which t~.c scnt0ncinq authority found to
r'xist,

WLIS

di"['''>secl

not arc;w'J in ~;ucll a fashion as to be as clearly

of by the

[ll'.Lcll'

opinJon in Pierre_.

Nevertheless,
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Point IV., p.

63

to

67.

(Due to the length of

respondent's briefs in the instant case and in Andrews
v. Morris, Sup. Ct. No. 16168, and the similarity of the
facts and legal argument in both cases, respondent requests
leave of this Court to incorporate certain portions of
respondent's brief in Andrews v. Morris by reference to
this case in the interest of efficiency.

The case of

Andrews v. Morris will be referred to herein as "No.

16168" for the sake of brevity and clarity) .
The ruling of Judge Sawaya dismissing appellant's
Third District Court petition reflects his finding that
appellant was attempting to raise issues that had been
raised and decided on direct appeal of appellant's conviction:
[t)he Court now makes the following
findings and conclusions:
2.
All the issues regarding the
constitutionality of the processes for
death sentencing under Utah law, the
constitutionality of the death sentence
in Petitioner's case, and the effect
of any alleged prejudicial publicity
or influences on Petitioner's trial
w'·1ich are raised by this Petition are
tr.e sa:-"e iss:..:es that Petitioner raiSed
or could iluve raised in his direct
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
(R. 159)
(emphasis added).
Appellant failed to shu..; sufficient originality of the
issues at tlw district court lc1·cl o.nd his efforts to do so
on appeal o.rc

unpcrsu~c.

i1·c.
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B.
RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
DO NOT EFFECT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION
AND SENTENCE.
Appellant's second contention on this Point is
that various capital punishment cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court during the period from 1976
to 1978 have an impact on appellant's conviction that
merits consideration in an evidentiary hearing.

The

cases were decided by the Supreme Court in three basic
time periods relevant to appellant's direct appeal:

(1)

after appellant had submitted his original brief but before
the State had filed its brief;

(2) aftertheState had filed

its brief but before the decision of this Court was
rendered on November 25, 1977; and (3) after the decision
by this Court in State v. Pierre, supra, but before
the inception of the instant petition.

Primary emphasis is

placed by appellant upon cases in the latter two categories.
Respondent submits that appellant's argument must fail on
this point as well because (l) the cases in the first
ti~e period were fully briefed and argued by both parties

by means of appellant's Amended Brief, respondent's Brief
and oral argument before this Court; therefore, this
Court's opinion in Pierre was issued with recognition of
those cases;

(2) appellant waived the opportunity to
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argue the cases in the second time period in his petition
by failing to raise them to this Court on his direct
appeal by means of supplementing his brief or by raising
them in a petition for rehearing.

Furthermore, as will be

shown infra, the arguments are unavailing on their merits, and
(3) appellant has failed to demonstrate that the cases in
the third time period warrant retroactive application or
that they are controlling of the instant case on their
merits.
The cases in the first time period include

~

v. Georgia, 428 U.S.l53 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242

(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);

(Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280

(1976).

As

shown by the briefs of the parties on direct appeal and the
opinion of this Court, these cases were before the Court
prior to the decision filed on November 25, 1977; thus, these
cases may not be argued again and appellant suffered no
prejudice by the

ti~e

sequence of their issuance in 1976.

Gc.rdncr v Florida, 430 U.S. 349

(1977);

(Harry)

Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); and Coker v.
Geo_r_gia, 433 U.S.

584

(1977), are the thrcce cases included

ln the second time perioJ,

after thP state had filed its

brief but before tiliS c,-,urt filc'cl its J0cision in Pierre
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on November 25, 1977.

It is significant to note that

Gardner was decided by the Supreme Court on March 22, 1977,
(Harry) Roberts, on June 6, 1977, and,Coker on June 29,
1977.

Respondent submits that these precise dates are

important in considering the ~lternatives open to appellant
if he had exercised diligence in informing this Court of
the law germane to his appeal.
When Gardner,

(Harry) Roberts and Coker were

decided in the interval between the filing of appellant's
Amended Brief on November 8, 1976, and this Court's decision
on November 25, 1977, appellant could and should have
briefed this Court on the significance of these cases in
either of two ways:

(1) by invoking Rule 75(p) (3), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for authorities not
uncovered before oral argument on the appeal to be
submitted to this Court by mail in order to supplement the
party's brief, or (2) by including the argument in a
brief in support of a petition for rehearing, Rule 76(e)
(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The dates on which

the three casesweredecided allowerl appellant some five months
in which to submit them to this Court prior to its decision,
and the cases could clearly have oeen argued in a petition
for rehearing.

This type of

siL,,~tion

is exactly the type

contemplated by the provision for rehearing and appellant
shotild have invoked this available remedy.

While appellant
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could not have known when this Court would issue its
decision in Pierre, supra, responsible appellate
advocacy demands that the parties fulfill their roles as
officers of the court and inform the court upon discovery
of cases of this magnitude.

Therefore, respondent maintains

that appellant may not argue these cases in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus because he could and should have
However,

raised the issues as part of his direct appeal.

given the nature of the importance of all case law in the
area of capital punishment, respondent shall discuss these
cases in order to exhibit their inapplicability to the
instant case.
Appellant has failed to argue in detail the impact
of (Harry) Roberts,supra, on this particular point and
respondent would concur in this implicit statement that
the case is inapposite.

(Harry) Roberts is fully

distinguishable from this case in that it involved a
mandatory death sentence for the murder of a police officer
under a Louisiana statute that did not permit
of particularized nitigating factors.

~either

the consideratic
issue is in

question in the instant case.
Gardner, ~~· i.e; arguecl by appellant primo.rily
for the proposition that Utol1's sentencing system is
defective because it does not provide for adequate pleading
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at 7.
at p.

This point is rebutted by respondent in No. 16168
58-63,

where respondent's argument is essentially

that the nature of Utah's bifurcated procedure in
capital cases operates to puta defendant on notice of
the aggravating circumstances to be relied upon by the
jury in the sentencing

phase by the specific focus of the

aggravating circumstances at the guilt phase.

This is

comparable to Texas' system upheld in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976).

As a result of the charges in the Information filed by the

prosecution, the conduct of the trial and the jury
instructions submitted to the jury, the defendant has
sufficient notice of the aggravating circumstances relied
upon in order to support a death sentence.

Gardner, on

the other hand, involved the use of secret information
by the trial judge in overruling a jury recommendation
of life imprisonment and an inadequate record on appeal,
both distinguishable facts from this case.
Coker, supra, is asserted by appellant to have
est~blished a "test'' that assesses the evolving standards of

decency in this country and is, allegedly, grounds for
scrutinizing the validity of Utah's means of imposing the death
penalty by shooting or hanging.

Respondent contends

that Coker did not purport to establish any "test" and
in no way can be extended from its foundation of finding
t1 1 o doath penalty for rape of an adult woman

disproportionate
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to appellant's conclusion that

the~

of imposing the

death penalty are subject to the disproportionality
analysis.

The Coker Court did not attempt to fashion a

broad test of

disproportionalit~

but rather embarked on

an in-depth review of the nationwide legislative
reiectinn of the death penalty as a punishment for the
crime of rape of an adult woman:
[I]n ~regc;, after gi\·ing due
regard to such sources, the Court's
judgment was that the death penalty
for deliberate murder was neither the
purposeless imposition of severe
punishment nor a punishment
grossly disproportionate to the
crime.
But the Court reserved the
question of the constitutionality of
the death penalty when imposed for other
crimes.
428 U.S. 187 n. 35. That
question, with respect to rape of
an adult woman is now before us. We have
concluded that a sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment for the crime of rape and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishmcn t.

433 U.S. at 592.
The Court's

holdi~g

is limited to the disproportionality

of the sentence of death to the crime of rape of an adult
womun.

Appcllan t' s suggestion of

discrec1iteJ by L!ust:ice

Po~>'c]l's

il

"test"

is further

comment:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-211-

[I]t is not this Court's function
to formulate the relevant criteria that
might distinguish aggravated rape from
the more usual case, but perhaps a
workable test would embrace the factors
identified by Georgia:
the cruelty or
viciousness of the offender, the
circumstances and manner in which the
offense was committed, and the consequences suffered by the victim.
Id. at 602 n.l.
There is not one scintilla of even dictum that suggests
that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), upholding execution by hanging and
shooting, is subject to challenge.

Respondent asserts that

shooting and hanging remain constitutionally permissible
means of imposing the death penalty and that Coker has no
material affect upon appellant's conviction or sentence.
See also, No. 16168, p. 72-73 and Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 6161 ('.>th Cir. 1978), cert. denied

u.s.

(March 26, ]979), finding electrocution a

constitutionally permissible method of execution.
Cases in the third time period, after State v.
Pierre

was decided, include Lockett v. Ohio,

98 S.Ct. 2954

(1978), Bell v. Ohio,

---u.s.

u.s.

_ _ _ , 98

(1978), an~ now arguably a third case which

S.Ct. 2977

appellant has faileo to cite, Presnell v. Georgia,

u.s.

,

58 L.Ecl

Locke!_!: and Dell,

7cJ 20"1

thai-

(1978).

Appellant argues, as per

h"cause appellant was allegedly

ncvC"r sp 0 cifically fo11nr" to have taken life nor intended
S.J. Quinney
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improper.

Brief of appellant at 8.

discuss ~snell separately).

(Respondent will

Respondent's counter to

the Lockett-Bell argument is discussed in detail in
No. 16168 at p. 67-70 ; it is basically that (1) the

cases

are distinguishable from the instant case because of the
differing

degree of involvement in the murders by the

respect~

defendants and (2) the instant case is not an imposition of
a "purely vicarious theory of liability." 98 S.Ct. at 2972
(Justice Marshall, concurring).

The conduct of appellant

in the instant case, involving a series of murders and
bizarre conduct that amounted to torture of the victims,
can hardly be ignored to the extent that appellant argues
that the jury never found that he took life or intended to
take life.

Appellant's acts speak for themselves, and the

jury's finding of guilt of murder in the first degree under
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances of intentional
murder was sufficient finding that appellant intended to take
and did take the lives of his victims.
In Presnell v. Georgia, suora, the Supreme Court
found that the

de~enda~t

had no notice whatsoever of the

grounds upon which the state was relying to prove the
requisite aggravating circumstance.

The Georgia Supreme

Court found evider1ce of an aggravating cricu:nstancc on
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appeal from a review of the entire record, but no such
circumstance was ever expressly proved or found at trial.
Thus, the defendant was denied any opportunity to rebut the
State's case before it was submitted to the jury during
the sentencing phase.

Presnell is distinguished by the

same reasoning urged by respondent inregard to Gardner v.
Florida, supra.

Additional argument concerning Presnell

is set forth in No. 16168 at p. 60-61.

In short, respondent

maintains that the specificityof the Information filed
by the prosecution charging the offenses of first degree
murder, the jury instructions and the course of the trial
were adequate notice to appellant of the aggravating
circumstances relied upon by the state and found by the
jury in support of a death sentence.
To summarize, respondent submits that the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
cases discussed above do not carry sufficient precedential
weight to affect the validity of appellant's conviction
and sentence.
Gardner,

Each Supreme Court case in the line of

(Harry) Roberts, Coker, Lockett, Bell, and Presnell

arises in a

factual context that is clearly distinguishable

from the instant case.

None of the cases presents a new

significant test that departs from the basic premises and
requirements of Furman and the Cregg-Proffitt-Jurek trilogy,
under which this Court found and should continue to find
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Utah's death penalty procedure sound and appellant's
conviction and sentence immune to attack.

c.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW DESPITE
APPELLANT'S ATTEMPT TO CHARACTERIZE
THEM AS FACTUAL IN NATURE.
Appellant asserts that three of his claims made
to the District Court were factual in nature and required
an evidentiary hearing before they could be ruled upon:
(1) the pattern and practice of prosecution of capital
felonies in Utah and the United States which is allegedly
arbitrary and discriminatory;

(2) the arbitrary and

capricious imposition of the death penalty because of
"unlin.ited discretion in the sentencing authority" and
(3) the arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution of capital
cases because of race and poverty.

Respondent submits that

these claims were•properly dismissed as matters of law and
did not require any factual determination.
The assertion that questions of fact exist
may be dismissed by a court if in reality the factual
assertions merely color what is essentially a legal issue.
Spinkellink v.

\~ainwright,

1978), cert. denied,

578 F.2d 582, 590-91,

u.s.

(5th Cir.

(March 26, 1979).

Spinkellink, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
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In

When, however, it affirmatively
appears from the petition that a
petitioner is not entitled to the
writ, an evidentiary hearing is
unnecessary • • • For example, if a
petitioner's habeas corpus allegations
raise legal questions only, a district
court's refusal to hold an evidentiary
hearing does not violate the directives
of Townsend (Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963)) or Section 2254 (d) • • •
This rule would also apply when a trial
court holds an inadequate evidentiary
hearing, for if only questions of law
are involved, an evidentiary hearing to
develop fully the facts underlying a
petitioner's complaints would be
pointless.
578 F. 2d 590,

(citations omitted).

Appellant's claim that the pattern and practice of
prosecution of capital cases is improper was correctly
excluded by Judge Sawaya as an issue that could have been
raised on appeal and thus be dismissed as a matter of law.
Moreover, respondent's memorandum to the lower court (R. 146)
traced the roots of this argument to Gregg v. Georgia, supra,
and demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that the
issues was rejected by the United States Supreme Court
and thus could be rejected by Judge Sawaya as a matter of
law as well as on the waiver doctrine theory.
Ap?ellant's second "factual issue" is a third
restatement of the argument that the jury is afforded too
much discretion in the sentencing phase.
has been discussed supra, p. 12-13 .

This argument

Despite the fact that

appellant and his co-defendant were the first to be
convicted under Utah's latest capital punishment provisions,
the claim of discrir.1ination because of jury discretion could
l!ct,·c'
.:md
supportC'd
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time of the direct appeal.

Under appellant's reasoning,

no clear date could be established as a cut-off for the corn~ilAtion

of such data because each death sentence, execution or

decision of a capital case in general would add to the
open-ended analysis and prevent an execution from ever being
carried out. This approach was expressly rejected as being
unworkable in Spinkellink, supra, at 604-606.

Moreover,

appellant was required to support this claim with sufficient
information to comply with Rule 65B(i).

He failed to do so,

either in his pleadings or his argument on respondent's motion
to dismiss, and thus the issue was properly dismissed as a
matter of law.
The third

clai~

on this point concerns the

questions of race and poverty and the alleged discriminatory
application of the death penalty.
at length in No. 16168.

This

This claim is discussed

very issue

was

disposed of as a matter of law in Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582,614-616 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied
(March 26, 1979).

u.s.

Spinkellink should be followed by

t:his Court.

D.
A SUSPENSION OF THE IMPOSITION OF TilE
DEATH PENALTY PENDING AN EXAMINATION
OF STUDIES DY COrtr·lENTATORS AND
COUNSEL \~OULD FRUST!V\TE THE USE OF
A VALID CRIMINAL SANCTION.

Appellant, in an effort to excus0 his failure to
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state of the law with respect to capital punishment in the
United States is very technical and some issues simply
were not apparent until the law had been extensively studied
by commentators and counsel."

Brief of appellant at 5.

At the hearing on respondent's motion to dismiss, Judqe
Sawaya stated:
One thing that disturbs me is the
fact that, regardless of our feeling about
capital punishment, it seems that what
you are urging is that in any situation
where an individual is convicted and
sentenced to death I guess we should
wait over a few years period and see
whether or not there are others that are
so convicted and sentenced and then if it
is not being imposed on an equal pattern
then the man should have a stay and should
have a new trial or something.
I'm not
sure I buy that theory but I'm willing
to give it some consideration.
(Trans. November 30, 1978 at 32).
Judge Sawaya subsequently rejected appellant's theory.
Appellant's argument on this issue suffers from
the defect suggested by Judge Sawaya:

under appellant's

argument, there is no definite time which would mark an
end ~o the consideration of a capital sentence.
ne·.., case would arguably

Each

require a reconsideration of the

prior sentence and conviction.

Spinkellink, supra, expressly

rejected this type of "wait and see" approach.

578 F.2d 582,

613-614.

In conclusion, respondent maintains that appellant
has fLJilccl to raise an issue that is not precluded as a
matter
or
utah's
habeasprovided
corpus
l·:aiver
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Furthermore, the claims are without merit as applied
to the

inst~nt

case and should be dismissed by this Court.
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POINT II.
THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED
IN UTAH CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES
DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFT THE
BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT, ALLOW
FOR UNGUIDED SENTENCING DISCRETION, OR
MAKE THE DEATH PENALTY MANDATORY.
Under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.

§§

76-5-202

and 76-1-501 (Supp. 1973), the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder v.-as committed
under any one of eight statutorily-defined circumstances.
Only afteritis found by a unanimous jury that the State
has proved every element of the substantive offense of
first dPqree murder, may thedeath penalty be considered.
Utah Code Ann.

76-3-206 (1)

§

(Supp. 1973).

The sentencing

phase of the bifurcated proceeding is then the opportunity
for both prosecution and defense to present evidence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which may have attended
the commission of the crime, or which focus on the character
of the defendant.
t~ose

Aggravating circumstances may include

outlined in Section 76-5-202.

Mitigating circumstances

m3y include duress, youth, intoxication, etc., or "any
other fact in mitigation of the penalty."
§

76-3-207 (1).

(Supp. 1973).

Utah Code Ann.

If the jury is unable to

unanimously find for the death penalty at the conclusion
of th0 penalty phase, the court is required to impose a

0 ;entenc-~ of life imprisonment.

Utah Code Ann. 5 76-3-207(2)
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This Court held in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d
at 1347-1348 (Utah 1977), that the burden is on the state in
the penalty phase to show that the totality of evidence of
aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of
mitigating circumstances.

This Court further found that in

this case the trial court properly instructed the jury as
to this requirement.

Pierre,

Appellant attacks

~·

bot~

at 1348.

the standard of proof and

the sentencing procedure on three grounds:

first, because

the State has already proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of

~~r0er

under one of the statutory circumstances

which may also be considered as aggravation, the burden
of

pro~ing

~iliyation

falls upon defendant; second, the

standard of proof is too low to prevent

,;outweigh"

mistakes or give adequate guidance to the sentencing
discretion of the judge or jury; and third, the low
standard

m~kes

the death penalty mandatory where no

mitigation is presented.
First it should be noted that the standard of
nroo:=

::~o\·er::i::;

t:-:~

~,e;-:a.l

ty r~ase o:

2

capital prosecution

was an issue raised on appellant's first appeal to this
Court.

(See Point XII, Appellant's Amended Brief, State

v. Pierre).
should be

Appellant contendcJ there that the State

rcq~ired

to prove

Lrvr~J

a r0asonahle doubt
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correctly found that such a burden may well be impossible
to carry in some instances and that no authority existed
for imposing such an unreasonable requirement.
sup~a,

at 1347.

Appellant has merely

Pierre,

rephrased his original

argument with a new emphasis on an alleged statinq of the
burden of proof at sentencing.

This issue certainly could

have been raised on appeal and is therefore barred by the
waiver doctrine, Point I. supra.

Second, all three of the

attacks upon Utah's sentencing procedure enumerated above
could have been raised in a petition for rehearing to this
Court but were not.

Also, they were urged upon the

United States Supreme Court
certiorari.

as grounds

for granting

The Supreme Court denied certiorari and while

this was admittedly not a ruling upon the merits, it
can be considered a ruling that no significant or
unresolved legal issues were presented.
334

u.s.

672

Wade v. Mayo,

(1948:. The prese~t raisingof these issues

therefore represents nothing more than a re-litigation
of arguments already found by this Court and the Supreme
Court to be either lacking in significance or substance.
Indeed, since these issues have tv1ice been briefed ty
t~e

State, once on

t~e

appeal to this Court and once in

opposition to certiorari, and since Judge Sawaya hild
both briefs and both court rulin0s submitted to him as
part of respondent's motion to dismiss, it was totally
proper for him to reject appellant's claims as a matter
0f
,-1n l

1:~1:

on the

~:1c>.cri

•_hc·o·-·; tl:at

1"''J3l r;H·r ~~ nr

the·]·

J,,,c! been previousl~r resolved

suff ic Lc,nt

su!JstZlnCe

(F~

150) ..
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With respect to appellant's first contention, the
burden of proof is not shifted to the defendant under the
Utah procedure but remains at all times upon the State.
Pierre,

supra, at 1347.

The appellant here is confusing

the state's burden of proof with his burden of going
forward.

Burden of proof denotes the duty of establishing

the truth of a given proposition by such a quantum

of

evidence as the la.,.: demands in the case in \oJl1ich the
issue arises, \.,hether civil or criminal, Hill v. Smith,
260

u.s.

592 (1923), while the burden of going forward is

a term used to

designat~

the duty of proceeding with

evidence at a particular stage in a court proceeding,
e.g., McElroy v. Force, 75 Ill.App.2d 441, 220 N.E.2d
761 (1966).
ed. 1940).

See also IX \Vigmore, Evidence

§

2487

(3d

In the instant case, a legal duty was not

imposed upon appellant

to produce evidence of mitigating

circumstances, but rather a practical necessity of going
fon:ard was imposed by self-interest.
provrd

beyo~d

a reasonable doubt the existence of at

the guilt phase
necessity of

\·ihen the State has

o~

goi~g

a

c~pital

for~ard

murder trial, a practical

wit~

evidence n'av \'el·y \\'211 be pli-!C"'•:l

at least some mitigating
U"JOn

t:1e

clefcndi'lnt
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during the sentencing proceeding by the defendant's own
self interest to save his life, but such is not a legal
burden placed upon him by statute and the burden of
persuasion remains always with the State.
Additionally, while the State has previously
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a
statutory aggravating circumstance as a prerequisite to a
finding of guilt and as a condition precedent to reaching
the sentencing phase of the bifurcated proceeding, the
aggravating circumstance during the sentencing phase is
simply one factor among many to be weighed when determining
whether or not this is an appropriate case for the
impos)tion of the death penalty.

While this factor may

weigh heavily in the minds of the jury or judge, it is
statutorily given no more weight than other factors in
aggravation or mitigation.

The defendant may introduce

into evidence anything of probative force, and in addition
to the six statutory mitigating factors, "any other fact
in mitigation of the penalty."
~loreo\·e~,

i~

t~e

defe~dant

Section 76-3-207(1) (g).

chooses to have

t~e

sentencing

proceeding before a jury, as was done in the instant case,
the State need only fail to convince one juror that the
aggravating circu~stances do not outweigh

the mitigating,
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and life imprisonment, rather than the death penalty, is
impnsen, since the jury's decision on penalty must be
unanimous.

Section 76-3-207 (2)

(Supp. 1973).

One can see that the appellant here is
arguing circularly.

He would certainly have cause to

complain if the State did not have to prove all elements
of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Yet

once the State has proved a:' necessary elements, appellant
at.tcr•rts to comr>l:lin that by meeting its burden the State
has improperly Made rr.itigation harder to sho•.·:.

st.J.tute is st:

1n~cnt

un

tht

StdtE~~

The real

It requires proof beyond

reasonable douht of aggravat1ng circumstances in the guilt
Aggravation must be proved in order to obtain a

ph~se.

simple conviction, not just in order to obtain the death
penalty.

This Court has recognized that the Utah statutes more

fully

satisfy

the requirements of minimizing "the risk of

1-'~0lly

arbitrary an·J capricious action," Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. lSJ, 189

(1' 1 76),

than other state standards.
o:

This

-.::roo.= beyo:1C:: a .!:.·ea.SO!l.clble

doubt obtains in the lJUilt Fhase in Utah to find the crime
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But even if appellant were to have what he is
urging, there would be no difference.

Presently the State

must prove aggravation in the guilt phase and consequently
it has a harder time securing the initial conviction, but
perhaps an easier time proving aggravation in the
sentencing phase.

Appellant urges that the State should

bear the burden of proving aggravating circumstances in
the sentencing phase, yet this simply means that there
would be less that the State would need to prove in order to
secure the initial conviction, which indeed would violate
the concerns of Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684
cited in appellant's brief.

(1975),

In either case, the State

would have to prove aggravating circumstances "overwhelmingly"
and appellant presented only the "most minimal"
considerations.

Pierre, supra, at 1348.

mitiaa~ing

Therefore,

whether the State in this case should bear its

reasonable

doubt burden more heavily in the sentencing phase or the
guilt phase is of no material significance.
!!oreove~,

it is not true

t~at

securing a conviction, has effectively

the State, by
guaranLe~d

the

death penalty unless the defendant comes forward with strong
mitigation.

As stated, the jury must be unanimously

convinced that agsravation outweighs mitigation, section
76-3-207 (2), and the State bears the burden of convincing
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them.

If neither party presented additional evidence at

the penalty phase, it is pure speculation to suggest that
the jury would always impose death.

In any case, here

appellant did present mitigating evidence and the State
~

present additional aggravating considerations.

That

evidence included arguments as to the deterrent effect of
the death penalty, the intelligence level of the appellant,
and his past criminal activities.
4270, 4136-4137).

(Tr. 4197-4234, 4247-

The jurv was properly instructed and

they unanimously found for the capital penalty.
Petitioner's reliance on In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358

(1970), and Mullaney v. \·Jilber, supra,

is misplaced.

This Court in In re Winship, supra, held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in the adjudicatory stage of a
proceeding when a juvenile is charged with an act that
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.

In

footnote l, the Court expressly stated that the opinion was

In rc ::.3u:t. 387 U.S. at 13).
\Hlbcr, 421 U.S. 684

397 C.S.

at 359.

r1ullanev v.

(1975), held that t:.c lluc Process

Clau5e of the Fourteenth Amcndnent

re~~ires

to prove beyond a reCJso:1aLlc> c:oulJt

c":,~r·:

the wrosecution

[,-,ct

ncce.~:J;n·y
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constitute the crime charged.
Code Ann.

§

76-1-501(1)

This is exactly what utah

(Supp. 1973), requires.

It is

important to note the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in Jl.1ullaney:
Having once met that rigorous
(beyond a reasonable doubt) burden
of proof that, for example, in a
case such as this, the defendant not
only killed a fellow human being, but
did it with malice aforethought, the
State could quite consistently with
such a constitutional principle
conclude that a defendant who sought
to establish the defense of insanity,
and thereby escape any punishment
whatever for a heinous crime, should
bear the laboring oar on such an
issue.
421

u.s.

at 706.
The Utah Supreme Court correctly ruled

"~lullanev

that:

is not applicable in this matter as the Maine

statute shifted the proof . . . to the defendant in a trial
where guilt or innocence was determined.

~ullaney

does

not reac~ or control ~atters in the penalty chase."
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1347 (Utah 1977).
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No burden of proof is shifted under the Utah
capital-sentencing procedure.

Here the State simply

proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
substantive offense, thus meeting the concerns of
Winship and Mullaney.

What appellant in fact argues is

that the State carried its bur6en too well and made it
more difficult for him to effectively show rniti<Jation.
This hardly aMounts to a constitutional defect.

There

is no question that if Mitigation is desired, the
defendant 1:1ust show it.

The State has no obligation

to prove the absence of mitigation.
supr~,

State v. Pierre,

at 1347 (citing Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek).
Appellant's second argument, that the "outv;eigh"

standard of proof in the sentencing phase is too low and
so allows for error and unguided discretion is likewise
unfounded andwas argued previously on appeal.

The United

States Supreme Court has already upheld a procedure
wherein the standard was that the totality of aggravating
c~~c~~s~~nccs

out~cigh

Th~

circumstances.
that therP he "
as

enurr,,~crutPd

the totality of

~itigating

Florida death penalty statute required
. insufficient Mitigating circumstances,

in sttbsection (7), to out\·.·eigh the aggravatin::

circuc-.stc1nc~s."

Fl<1. Stat. Ann.,

§

921.141

(Supn. 1976-1977'

(emphasis added)
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In approving this standard the Court stated:
The directions given to the judge and
jury by the Florida statute are sufficiently
clear and precise to enable the various
aggravating circumstances to be weighed
against the mitigating ones. As a result,
the trial court's sentencing discretion
is guided and channeled by a system that
focuses on the circumstances of each
individual homicide and individual
defendant in deciding whether the death
penalty is to be imposed.
Proffitt v. Florida, 428

u.s.

242, 258

(1976)

(emphasis added).

This Court in the Pierre case referred to the Florida statute
and the Proffitt holding as authority for its ruling that
in the penalty phase the State must prove aggravating factors
that outweigh the mitigating, Pierre, supra, at 1347, 1348,
in order that the jury can More fully balance the equities
and be guided by the facts.
A similar "balancing"approach was adopted by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code, ALI, Model Penal Code

S

201.6, Comment 3, p. 71 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), and
cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court in
Gregg ,. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 193-195 (1976):
While soMe have suggested that standards
to guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are impossible to formulate, the fact is
that such standards have been developed.
lfuen
the drafters of the Model Penal Code faced
this problem, they concluded 'that it is wi~hin
the realm of possibility to point to the maLn
circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation
that should be weiCJhccl and weiCJhed against each
other wh0n they are presented in a concrete
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case.'
[Citations omitted, emphasis in
original.] While such standards are by
necessity somewhat general, they do provide
uidance to the sentencin authority and
t ereby reduce the l~kelihood that it will
ir.tpose a sentence that fairly can be called
capricious or arbitrary.
(emohasis added) .
Therefore, the State's burden of proving aggravation in
excess of mitigation constitutionally insures an absence
of arbitrariness and capriciousness.
Appellant's third argunent, that in Utah the
death sentence can be mandatorily imposed, is without merit
and was, again, u:--<:erl uron the United States Supreme Court
as grounds for granling certiorari.

As stated earlier,

appe:Llant has no <Jro'Jnds for a complaint that if a defendant
remains silent in the sentencing phase of his trial, a death
sentence will be mandated by his earlier conviction.

Appel-

lant did attemrt to argue mitigating circumstances.

His real

problem is simply that the factors which he offered in
mitigation of his brutal crime were "most minimal--even
froM the point of vie1v of inference."
v~-

c··~n

~s

a~

abst~act

Pierre, supra at 1348.

co~sijeration,

a

co~viction

in Utah for first degree Murder never mandates death.

A

jury is sL1tutor i l\' ernpoh·ered to iM;,ose a. li fc sentence
whenever one iuror decides against death after aggravating
and mitiyatinCJ L1ctnrs at·e l:cic:jhc:1.
76-3-207 (2)

(S~::o:'.

Utah Code Ann.

~

lLJ"i\).
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Note that appellant's attempt to compare the
Utah capital punishment procedures to those found
unconstitutional in the Louisiana cases is without
foundation.

In Roberts v. Louisiana, 428

u.s.

325 (1976),

the Court held invalid a state scheme in which the jury
was required to determine only whether there was a specific
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm under one of
five statutory circumstances.

If the conjunction of intent

and specific statutory act was found, the offense was first
degree murder and the mandatory punishment was death.

Any

qualification or recommendation which a jury might add to
its verdict was without any effect.

Such a statutory scheme

is clearly inapposite to that in Utah.
Finally, appellant's contention that "Utah is the
only state where the standard of proof in the capital
sentencing phase is so low" is simply untrue, as witnessed
by the standard of proof employed by Florida during the
capital sentencing phase of their proceedings and discussed
above.

Ap?ellant's further statement that Utah is the

only jurisdiction where the substantive elements of the
capital offense are the sa~e as the aggravating
circumstances needed to be proved to sentence the offender
to death is also incorrect.

The United States Supreme
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Court stated in Jurek v. Texas, 428

u.s.

262 (1976):

While Texas has not adopted a list of
statutory aggravating circumstances the
existence of which can justify the imposition
of the death penalty as have Georgia and Florida,
its action in narrowing the categories of murders
for which a death sentence May be imposed serves
much the same purpose.
Id. at 270.
The so-called "low

standard" in Utah only exists because

such a high standard is required for a conviction as in
Texas.

Utah is no different than the "vast majority of

jurisdictions" cited in footnote 5 of appellant's brief at
22, in that it also requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of any aggravatinq circumstance.

That proof is simply

required at an earlier stage of the proceeding.
Since the jury "must have information prejudicial
to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of
penalty in order to impose a rational sentence," Gregg,
428

u.s.

at 190, 191, it follows that if the defendant has

little or no evidence to present in mitigation during the
sent~ncing

tha:. the

where tl1c

?hasE

c~c:a.t:-t

a~

the bifurcated proceeding, it is probable

pc::na.lty ·..;ill be irL!Josed.

~urd~rs

T~is

are of an extraordinarily

is

~ore

and

grucso~e

tortuous nature since mitigation in such cases
compcllin<J in order to outweigh the aggravating

~ust

likely

he more

circu~stance
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of brutality.

But in no sense is the death sentence

mandatorily imposed.

"Mandatory" connotes a statutory

usurpation of the jury's right to weigh individual
equities and to choose the sentence which it feels the
case v1arrants.

(Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, supra.

Appellant has failed to raise any unresolved or
material issue in Point II of his brief.

The Utah death

penalty statutes did not shift any burden to appellant.
Further, appellant was given the benefit of a sentencing
proceeding in which all relevant mitigating factors he
wished to present were weighed against the aggravating
factors which the State had to produce.

Finally, first

degree murder in Utah is nevFr punished by a mandatory
death sentence.
These issues were previously raised to this Court
on appellant's direct appeal althou<]h couched in soMewhat
different terms.

Certainly, the

is~.,,cs

could have been

raised on that appeal even in the same manner presented
here.

Indeed, the identical issues were briefed to the

United States Supreme Court I·Jilich cl :nicd certiorari.
Thus, Judge Sawaya properly dismissed these arguments as
a mcttter of law on two theorj ''":

(1) Utah's waiver

doctrine precluded further rcvic~ of the jssues because
the~· 1:crc or certainly coulrl h:•ve b, ''n raised on
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appellant's direct appeal; and (2) based on prior adjudication of these issues by the Utah Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court (Gregg, Jurek, Proffitt, etc.),
the district court properly concluded that the issues
lacked sufficient legal merit to warrant further postconviction review.
POIHT III.
THE CONCEDED QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BET\1EEN A
SENTENCE OF DEATH AND A SENTENCE OF LIFE IHPRISONMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A COURT TO ENGAGE IN
REPEA'l'ED REVIEW OF RESOLVED OR Il"lMATERIAL LEGAL
AND FACTUAL ISSUES.

Respondr·nt concedes that there is a qualitative
diff~rence

betwPen death and life.

The authority which

appellant citPs for this proposition, however, must be
viewed in its proper context.

Woodson v. North Carolina,

428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977), and Lockett v. Ohio, 572 L.EcL2d 973 (1978), all
involved the United States Suprene Court's own review of
the merits of the cases.
sta;L~S

fo!: t>.-:2

?:-o~c.:;ition

The language which is cited
that :::te

cou~t.s,

t·:heil they do

review capital cases (which the United States Supreme Court
refused to do in appellant's case) nusl he careful in their
re\·ic·•.,ing in order to insure that any decision to impose
death is "based on reason rathPl- than caprice or cnotion."
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place.

This Court has reviewed appellant's conviction

and sentence and has affirmed it.

The Supreme Court in

turn has declined to spend its time in further review
of appellant's alleged "substantial" issues.

Respondent

therefore submits that at this stage of the proceedings,
it is the quality of appellant's legal claims more than
the nature of the possible penalty which determines
whether this Court would be acting either unconscionably
or in violation of due process when it may affirm the
granting of the dismissal motion to appellant's habeas
corpus petition.
First, Points

I, II, and IV herein show that

no new legal issues have been presented as a basis for
relief or that if there are such issues, failure to raise
them on direct appeal constitutes a waiver.
Second, the State

has a

very

leqitimate

interest in insuring that the already lengthy time of litigation is not unduly extended.
a

defe~dant nor~ally

Appellant has argued that

will not hold back or "save" issues

in order to rilise them by means of a writ of habeas corpus
because to do so Hould preclude a defendant from immediate
relief.

Note, however, that there is no absolute difference

bet 1,een relief available on appeal and that available through
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habeas corpus.

Just as outright release is possible

through direct appeal, Utah Code Ann.

§

76-3-405 (Supp.

1973), so is subsequent prosecution possible after a
defendant has successfully sought habeas corpus, Utah
Code Ann. S 76-1-405(2) (Supp. 1973).

There is therefore

a real possibility that a defendant may unreasonably
extend the litigation time by not asserting all known
grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Utah's approach

not only conserves judicial resources but also helps
prevent prejudice to the State's case which may result
from having to re-try the defendant years later when
witnesses might not he available and

me~ories

are no

longer fresh.
Thirn, appellant maintains that since all of
his claims allege deprivations of constitutional rights
he cannot be prevented from asserting them in his habeas
corpus petition except by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.

Appellant confuses the doctrine of collateral

estoppel with the doctrine of waiver.
Foint I. in No. 16168, and Point

I\'

See respondent's

of this brief, infc-u..

Respon1ent again maintains that if the issues could have

be~

raised on direct appeal, they are waived as to any
collu.teral relief.
968

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 400 P.2d

(l'l68); Bryant v.

(1967).

~1oceovcr,

Tu~!2~..!:·

Pule

19 Uto.h 2J 284, 431 P.2d 121

G~ll(Ll (l),

L:t.e1h

'"-:ulcc; of Civil
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Procedure, further requires that a habeas corpus petitioner
raise issues which assert a "substantial" denial of constitutional rights.

Thus, if the court considering the post-

conviction claims determines that as a matter of law no
claims of "substantial" deprivation are alleged, he may dismiss
the petition under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Finally, the severity of the penalty does not make
it automatically unconscionable for this Court to deny
further review of the habeas corpus petition.

Appellant,

by stressing the difference between life and death, seems
to be urging the position that habeas corpus review is
automaticaly required in all capital punishment cases.
Again, the legal claims asserted, not the penalty at stake,
must control.

This was clearly the criteria utilized by

the United States

Supreme Court in denying appellant's petition

for writ of certiorari, and when it most recently denied a
Florida death row inmate's final application for certiorari
without opinion In Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied

U.S.

(March 26,

1979) .
Note that a state need not make post-conviction
relief available at all if it so chooses.
ricbraska, 381 u.s.

In Case v.

336 (1965), the Supreme Court recenlly

sLJtc-cl:
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It does not follow, however, that this
Court has the power to compel a state to
employ a collateral post-conviction remedy
in which specific federal claims may be
raised.
~a~~

Florida, No. 77-6025, cert. denied, 435

u.s.

1014, 1017 (1978).
Second, since the State enjoys this "wide
discretion" in "devis[ing] their own systems of
review in criminal cases," Carter v. Illinois, 329

u.s.

173, 175 (1946), it follows thdt a state may limit a
post-conviction remedy as it deems appropriate.

Indeed,

this Court has limited the habeas corpus petition to
issues of jurisdiction, and obvious illegality of sentence.
Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (1977).
Therefore, since post-conviction relief is
disc=etionary with the State and since once a state does
adopt some method of review as in Rule 65B(i), it may limit
the scope and applicability of that method, it follows that
appellant is not entitled to a hearing on his petition
simply by virtue of the fact that the penalty which may
confront him is severe.
review in capital cases.
States

s~~~e~e

There is no per se habe0s corpus
The very fact that the United

Court denies nurerous

certior~ri

petitions

in capital cases attests to the fact that the qualitative
difference between a prison term and death alone is
insufficient to overcome defects in
leC]C!l

o~

absence of viable

iSSUC'S.

Tlwrefore, bccnuse ilpprl L1nt !us rnjoycd lhE• full
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as it chooses, within the bounds of due process,
appellant may be precluded from a hearing on his
petition by his failure to raise issues on timely
appeal and his failure here to raise any unresolved,
substantial or material issues.

Appellant's possible

penalty does not require this Court or any postconviction court to order repeated review of his
conviction and sentence.
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POINT IV.
UTAH'S POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS
WAIVER DOCTRINE WAS A PROPER BASIS
FOR THE LOWER COURT'S DISHISSAL OF
ALL ISSUES AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE
FACE OF THE PLEADINGS.
Appellant raises four claims on this Point
which essentially revolve around the assertion that
res iudicata was improperly applied in his case to
preclude him from raising

t~e

issues contained in his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
claims on appeal are:

The appellant's

(1) Utah procedure sustained by

this Court i ', r< st-conviction habeas corpus cases has
virtually suspended the writ in violation of Article I,
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution;

(2) Appellant was

prevented from raising "substantial state and federal
constitutional questions";

(3) collateral estoppel

and not res judicata should be applied by courts in
post-conviction habeas corpus cases; and

(4) the Third

District Court was required to have the complete record

of issues raisc<i

)y)

appellant.

Appellant's

funda~ental

premise concerning

r~s

iudicata suffers rrom a basic misunderstanding of the
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waiver doctrine detailed at length by respondent, supra,
in Point I., and in No. 16168 at p.

9-25.

A review

of the numerous Utah cases involving post-conviction writs
of habeas corpus reveals that the Utap Supreme Court has
repeatedly invoked what is essentially a waiver doctrine
in regard to recognizable claims.

A petitioner may not

raise claims in a post-conviction petition for writ of
habeas corpus that could or should have been raised on
direct appeal.

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.

2'. 968

This standard is imposed whether an appeal

(1968).

is or is not taken.
P.2d 121 (1967)
P.2d G97

Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431

(no appeal taken); Maguire v. Smith, 547

(Utah 1976)

(appeal taken).

The tyPes of claims

that are permissible on a post-conviction writ are stated
in Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108

(Utah 1977):

[T)he writ has its purposes, including
the providing of a remedy where it
challenges the jurisdiction of the court
rendering the judgment, or where the
sentence imposed is one not authorized
by law, or where it is of an entirely
different character than that which the
statute prescribes, so that a person
is being held under an obviously illegal
sentence and it would thus be unconscionable
not to examine the issue.
560 P.2d at 1109.
An analysis of the habeas corpus waiver doctrine
ln this case h~s been muddled by appellant's interjection
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of elements of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

It

is necessary to clear up any confusion by examining the
exact nature of the concepts of waiver, collateral
estoppel and res judicata.
Initially, it must be understood that res
judicata has generally been held to be inapplicable in
the area of habeas corpus.
(1963).

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391

The writ lies to test proceedings so fundamentally

lawless that imprisonment pursuant to them is void, not
merely erroneous, so the application of res judicata
would contravene the very nature of the writ.
Collateral estoppel and waiver are distinguished
in Bl_ack's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev. at 650:

"Waiver is

voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right,
benefit or advantage; estoppel is the inhibition to assert
it."

A party is generally precluded from relitigating an

issue that has been decided adversely to him in a prior
proceeding.

In retrospectively examining the rights of a

habeas coqJL;s j:>etitioner, this Court has not found the
~riso::er

~ro~

esto==ed

raising issues that could have been

raised on appeal but were not.

In that case, there has been

no adverse decision on the issue.

Father, the position of

this Court has been that a petitioner is found to hc:tve ~
claims tho.t could
l\S

st 0 t~._'c1

.J.Oo\··,-"',

)-LJYe

~:

been ro.iscd or• o.pn,·al but

.'_:~·-" 1

t·:r·~\..>!Ll'

in\:nl\·l-::s

\,.,,t-c'

not.

011 ("'1('J'1"'nt of
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'

intent or knowledge of the giving up of the right.

This

Court has deemed claims that could have been raised on
direct appeal as being within the knowledge of petitioner,
supporting the finding of waiver.

When the state has

created the right of direct appeal of a criminal conviction,
it is not unreasonable to enforce a waiver doctrine with
respect to another state-created right, habeas corpus.
Thus, respondent contends that Utah courts are utilizing
a waiver theory, not collateral estoppel, and, furthermore,
a review of the merits of appellant's claims indicates
that the doctrine was correctly applied in this case.
Appellant's first argument concerning an alleged
uncon~~itutional

suspension of the writ runs contrary to

the commonly-accepted meaning of the Suspension Clause.
state constitution, Art. I, Sec. 5, is an

The

almost

verbatim adoption of the federal suspension clause, Art. I.,
Sec. 9, Cl. 2.

The suspension clause is directed at

suspects, not at convicts.

See Collings, Habeas Corpus for

Convicts--Constitutional Rights or Legislative Grace?, 40
Calif. L. Rev. 335, 340-41 (1952).

lmy modification of the

post-conviction writ of habeas corpus docs not run afoul
of the suspension clause.

Thus, any limitations imposed by

this Court upon the post-conviction use of the writ cannot
deprive petitioner of a state constitutional right.
Moreover, the writ has not been suspended, rather it has
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been limited in a permissible fashion by the state as
discussed in No. 16168, p.

9-25.

The assertion that "substantial state and
federal constitutional

rights "are raised in a habeas corpus

petition (appellant's second claim) does not, by

itself

meetapetitioner's burden of forming a specific, substantiated
pleading as required by Rule 65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure which requires a post-conviction habeas
corpus complaint to:
Set forth in plain and concise
terms the factual data constituting
each and every manner in which the
compl~1rant claims that any constitutional rights were violated.
The complainant shall have attached
thereto affidavits, copies of records,
or other evidence supporting such
allegations, or shall state why the
same are not attached.
Thus, the petitioner in habeas corpus has the burden to
demonstrate to at least a threshold degree in his complaint,
that the facts upon which he bases his claim may provide
adequate grounds as a matter of law.
or

clai~s

a~2

sup~ortinc

If his statement

data are too vague

a~d

speculative to enable a court to determine if the waiver
doctrine is satisfied, the petitioner has not made out a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
facts are facts which
used to attack the

were

Or, if the

known in time to have been

co~victi~~ dirc~tlv

on

a~ocal

they also
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corpus, regardless of whether such an attack would have
been successful on the grounds claimed.
Judge Henry J. Friendly in his article,
Innocence Irrelevant?

!!

Collateral Attack on Criminal

Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 155-56 (1970), has
concluded that habeas corpus should not be available upon
a mere open assertion that a "constitutional" right has
been denied.

Utah, by means of Rule 658 (i) (2), _has

approved of this philosophy; because appellant's claims
of denial of state and federal constitutional rights
were open and unsubstantiated, they were properly dismissed
as a matter of law.
The third claim of error on this Point, the res
judicata - collateral estoppel argument, has been
adequately disposed of in the initial paragraphs of this
Point, supra, and in the additional sources cited therewith.
Appellant states that the court has used a procedure to
exclude issues in habeas corpus petitions "[W]ithout
actually calling it res judicata." Brief of appellant at 31.
Respondent has demonstrated that the reason "it" has never
been called res judicata is because, in reality, a waiver
doctrine is being employed.
Appellant's final contention on this point, the
alleged necessity of a complete record on which to base a
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motion to dismiss, is very

similar to the claim of error

raised and rebutted by respondent in No. 16168 at p.

32-48.

The essence of respondent's position on this point is
that nothing outside the pleadings was required for
Saw~yd

Judge

to dismiss all issues as a matter of law

because (1) habeas corpus is a unique proceeding to which
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure arc generally applicable
but are superseded by Rule 6'JB;

(2\

a

failure to comply

with the requirements of Hule 6SB (i) (2) made appellant's
petition faci:llly defective;
do not

ch:~nnl·

(4) Utah has

t :·".

(3)

naked factual assertions

nature of an underlying legal claim; and

~ccorded

the district court statutory authority

to fashion t·•tles or modes of proceeding that may be
utilized to conform to the spirit of the law.

1

See Points I

and II of respondent's brief in No. 16168.
Respondent,

in Point I, supra, demonstrates

that appellant's allcCJcdly "factual" claims are in reality
legal issues that were dismissed by Judge Sawaya on the
() f
~lJ'_t·:~·

:.. ~-. \

,\dcliri.,•ncllly,

appellant's rc•liance on Parrish v.

'•!j2 P.2d
Utc1!1

Rulcs of l't\'L l

Pn1ccdurc

1086

(Utah 1975), anc1 the

is und .. rcut by the' analysis

l
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of respondent in No. 16168 at p. 40.
Appellant states at p. 34 of his Brief,
"In remanding the case to the district court this court
must order the district court to allow the appellant to
raise issues that could have been raised on direct appeal
of his conviction."

(Emphasis added).

This concession

that the issues could have been raised on direct appeal puts
Utah's waiver doctrine squarely at issue.

Respondent's

discussion has shown the waiver doctrine to be constitutionally
sound in basis, applied with due process, and a legitimate
state method of administering criminal justice with fairness
and efficiency.

The doctrine should be upheld in this

case.
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POINT V.
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN
DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S HOTION TO
DISMISS SINCE, UNDER THE WAIVER
DOCTRINE, APPELLANT WAS RAISING
ISSUES IVHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN
ADJUDGED.
As noted in appellant's brief, the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus actions, according
to Burleigh v. Turner, lS Utah 2d ll8, 388 P.2d 412,
(1964).

414

Yet, inasmuch as those same rules provide unique

requirements for habeas corpus actions, respondent contends
that the rulings of

l~w

in this matter must also be in

accordance with the est.ahlished procedural requirements of
habeas corpus.

Specifically, respondent submits that Rule

65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, must additionally
be complied with by appellant in order to effectuate proper
habeas corpus relief.
The rule

requires

that a petitioner for habeas

corpus must "state that the legality or constitutionality of
his co:n".1itr:1cnt or

founJ

co01rirw~\c·nt

has not already been adjudged

to bC' !Jcinclin,, :t:1 action alccady a:ljuJc_Jccl,

Lllc rule

:I.
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As has been above discussed in Point I, respondent
submits that appellant is attempting to raise issues
heretofore decided and thus Judge Sawaya, as a matter of
law, was justified in dismissing his petition, as per
Rule 65B(i) (2).

Yet appellant contends that before a court

may dismiss a complaint, the court must be convinced "to
a certainty that plaintiff would be entitled to no relief
under any state of facts.

Liquor Control Commission

v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443

(1952).

This

would be a very strict burden of proof on a respondent.
Respondent, however, contends that such a degree of
certainty has not been required in all cases.

For example,

in King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d
339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962), this Court ruled that motions to
dismiss shall be sustained "only if the party [being
dismissed) could not in any event establish a right to
recover."

Id. at 256.

This general principle is also

cited in Baur v. Pacific Finance Corporation, 14 Utah 2d
283, 383 P.2d 397

(1963).

There, this Court determined that

motions to dismiss are harsh measures:
which courts should grant only
when it clearly appears that taking
the view most favorable to the
complaint and any facts which
might properly be proved thereunder,
no right to redress could be established;
and unless it so clearly appears,
doubt should be resolved in favor of
allowing him the opportunity ~o present
proof.
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383 P. 2d at 397 ·

(emphasis added).

In accord, Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d
207 (1965).
Thus, respondent submits that Judge Sawaya was
properly able to grant the motion to dismiss since appellant
could not meet the higher burden of Rule 65B(i) nor the
general requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and the non-habeas corpus cases, King Bros., Inc., supra,
and Baur, supra_.

.ll.lso, inasmuch as ap!Jellant had previously

raised issues in his direct appeal and since other issues
raised before

Jud~c

Sawaya could have been raised, it was

impossible for ap;Jellant to establish a further right to
relief and the

lo~er

court properly dismissed the complaint

as a matter of law.
If this Court were to affirm Judge Sawaya's action
it would not be a novel result.

Several decisions by this

Court have upheld similar rulings by Utah's lower courts.
The waiver doctrine is cited with approval as a proper bar
to u retitioner's reyuest for habeas corpus relief.

therefore, been u:)ilcld.
Pac. 1175 (1913);
P.2d 34 (1972);

Bruce v. East, 43 Utah 327, 134

:~_L'brwcncn

.\lr:.c~lj__c~~

_Reclcl:i_sl~~-·_ __:S:niti~,

c,~,J

v. Turner,

27 Utcth 2cl 428, 497

Smith, 531 P.2d 864

l'.2d S','J

(Utah 1975);

(Utah l'l78).
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As to the propriety of Judge Sawaya's ruling, it
should be noted that the State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338
(Utah 1977), case and briefs submitted thereon were
attached to respondent's motion and therefore Judge
Sawaya was able to make a judicious decision as to the
waiver doctrine.

That is, he could make objective decisions

as to the issues which were in fact raised on the direct
appeal, and he could make subjective determinations as to
issues which could have been raised.

Thus, he was able to

rule as a matter of law that the waiver doctrine barred
appellant from further arguing these foreclosed issues.
Points I, II, and IV,

See also, No. 16168, p. 9-49
supra.

Even if Judge Sawaya had desired to reach the
merits of appellant's claim of prosecutorial discretion,
the United States Supreme Court has expressly taken this
area out of consideration.

u.s.

238

(1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153

Proffitt v. Florida,
428 u.s. 262
280

See Furman v. Georgia, 408

~28

U.S. 242

(1976);

(1976); Jurek v. Texas

(1976); <.-:oodson •:. :-Jorth Carolina, 428 U.S.

(1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

See also:

Point I, supra, p.

16

No. 16168, p. 86-92

This position is further strengthened by the fact that
this Court has ruled on the merits of many of appellant's
claims

(State _\_.:_~'rre, su::Jra:, and the United Stutes

denied
certiot-Llri--thereby
acknmvledging
Sponsored by theCuurt
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that these issues were not new and did not require further

consideration.
Thus, respondent submits that, under the burden of
proving motions to dismiss petitions of habeas corpus, the
requirements of Rule 65B(i) (2) are dissimilar from
traditional civil actions.

While most civil actions cannot

be dismissed absent the strict standards of Athas, or the
standards of King Bros. and Baur, habeas corpus proceedings
only require the moving party to show that the issues being
raised have already been adjudged--or could have been
adjudged--and such showing requires the court to dismiss
the petition.

Therefore, respondent urges this Court to

affirm Judge .,ci\·Uya's rulirq, since, as a matter of law,
the grantin1 of respondent's motion to dismiss was in
accordance with this Court's waiver doctrine, Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 65B(i) (2), and the Utah and United
States Supreme Court cases above cited.
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POINT VI.
THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS GRANTED PURSUANT
TO UNIQUE HABEAS CORPUS RULES OF PROCEDURE
AND THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT CONVERTED INTO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Appellant asserts that post-conviction petitions
for writs of habeas corpus are civil in nature and are governed
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
.
ser1es
o f non- h a b eas corpus

. "1
ClVl

cases

He then cites a
2

for the proposition

that when a party files a motion to dismiss when there are
issues of fact in dispute, or attaches affidavits or other
factual material to his motion to dismiss, it is impermissible
for a court, on its own initiative, to convert the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without at least
allowing the opposing party the opportunity to present pertinent
material.

He claims that Judge Sawaya's ruling violated

the holdings of these civil cases.
Appellant's argument makes several unwarranted
assumptions and inferences which are incorrect.

He

incorrectly assumes that habeas corpus cases are governed
solelv by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to

2

Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150
(1970); Harvey v. sana-ers; 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975);
and Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production, 587 P.2d
151 (Utah 1978).
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pleadings and motions; he incorrectly implies that
respondent attached impermissible factual data to his motion
to dismiss making a ruling thereon impossible; and he
assumes that Judge Sawaya concluded that the respondent's
motion to dismiss contained factual matter, and that the court
therefore converted the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment on its own initiative and ruled thereon.
Respondent will show that each of these assumptions is
incorrect.
First, respondent agrees that post-conviction
habeas corpus is a civil remedy which is generally governed
by Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure.
15

Uta~

2d 118, 388 P.2d 412, 414

Burleigh v. Turner,

(1964).

However, it

must be recognized that unlike a regular civil case (where
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment are
asserted at the earliest stage of the proceedings often
after only an initial complaint has been filed commencing
the

ac~ion),

a post-conviction habeas corpus action commences

aftC'r nur.\crous prior court procc0dings hilvc already occurred

constitutional challenges
inc.\;·cL'rdtion.

to lits penc1inc; or actual

There has alrc•;_h-c\· ),,·en

portunity fo1: pl·c-trial motion"'
hearin0~.

challcn0us Lo the

(1) prior Or:>-

ti.e., Sllf'prcssion

con~Litutionality

of the
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statute under which the accused is charged, etc);

(2) a prior

criminal conviction where adjudication of facts and law has
been made; and (3) prior appellate review of the petitioner's
case.

Thus, post-conviction habeas corpus cases are

unique, quasi-criminal proceedings which are also governed
by a specialized set of rules and procedures promulgatee
by this Court through its rule-making authority 3 which
are set forth in Rule 65B(i), and which have been
supplemented by the case law of this Court.
Rule 65B(i), unlike rules governing the filing of
complaints in routine civil cases, additionally requires that
the habeas corpus complaint (petition):
1.

Assert a substantial denial of constitutional

2.

Identify the proceedings in which the complainant

rights;

was convicted;
3.

Set forth in plain and concise terms the

factual data constituting each and every manner in which the
comolainant claims that anv constitutional rights were
·:iolat2d;

4.

Have attached thereto affidavits, copies of

records, or other evidence supporting each allegation, or
shall state why the same are not attached;
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5.

State whether the conviction has been

reviewed on appeal, and, if so, identify such appellate
proceedings and state the results thereof;
6.

State whether the legality or constitutionality

of his commitment or confinement has already been adjudged
in a prior habeas corpus or other similar proceedings.
Rule 65B(i) (2).
Thus, habeas corpus complaints must be much more
comprehensive than thosP in regular civil cases.

The

petitioner must explain the grounds for the complaint,
and demonstrate to at least a threshold degree, their
substance tnrough su:)?Orting ottachments, etc.

Mere

naked, unsunpol·ted allegations or legal conclusions do not
satisfy this requirPment.

Rather, the petitioner has a

burden to make an initial showing of merit, and must
provide the reviewing court with certain information so that
a determination may be made b)· the court whether the petition
is frivolous, whether issues raised have been oreviously
adjudicated, or \vhctllc>r they are excluded by the wiliver

r.._,sponsivc pleaciin.:.
qov0rnin0
§

f~ci~ral

Pule 6:Jb(i) (2).

~rits

(Also

s~e

the Rules

of habeas corpus under 28 li.S.C.:

2 2 ') 4 , \v h i c h p n>

l"L"'C1Lli!."il1,1

Z1:l';.

!)l\'-l
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Thus, a determination of the applicability of
Utah's waiver doctrine may clearly be made by the court
based on the face of the habeas corpus pleadings and
certainly without the entire record of any prior proceedings
before the court as suggested by appellant.

Given the

comprehensive nature of the habeas corpus pleadings, the
reviewing court may determine expeditiously that the
petitioner appealed his conviction and raised certain
issues on appeal.

(Recall that Rule 65B(i) (2) requires

the petitioner to identify the appellate proceedings and
state the results).

The court may, then, based upon an

objective determination, summarily dismiss any issues
which .it sees were previously adjudicated on appeal.
LikePi~.c,

" subjective determination may be made whether the

issnccs now raised in the compluint could or should have
been raised on direct appeal, and if so, determine that they
are exc:luded by the waiver doctrine.
In the instant case, "i-'J'c·llant failed to completely
!_)rovide the court with the infon''''l io11 required by Rule
65B(i) when he filed his complailll.
filed

lu ,-

rcquisi

tP

motion to dismiss, he ;;

<

documents contemplatr

1•y

copi0." r•f prior decisions of th

c

I

''i

Thus, when respondent
i!Chcd copies of the
Hul c 6~ (i), to-wit:
ilh and United States

Supn~mC' C:at!rts and briefs filcc'l I•\' til(' respective parties
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These documents clearly provided ample

basis for the court to determine that the issues raised in
appellant's complaint either were raised or could have been
raised on direct appeal.

Moreover, appellant was accorded

the opportunity at the hearing on respondent's motion to
dismiss to rebut the applicability of the waiver doctrine
and explain why the issues in his petition were not raised
on appeal.

Obviously, the court found the appellant's

arguments (excuses) unpersuasive.
Appellant collaterally asserts that Judge

Sa~aya

must have the entire record of 9rior proceedings before him
"in order to make a determination that the raising of an
issue is foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata," citing
Parrish v. Layton City Corp. 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975),
(another non-habeas corpus civil case) .

Appellant has confused

the doctrine of res judicata with the unique habeas corpus
doctrine of waiver and thus the case is inapplicable.
(See respondent's argument in No. 16168, Point I. C., pp.
18-25).

Moreover, given the drastic difference between the

extent and scope of the pleadings in habeas corpus as
opposed
little

to regular civil
applicat~on.

pleadings,

Also, it

that in Parrish a summary

record (revealed)

should be

judgment was

the matter rcman(lc:l. br,cause ".

the case has
noted

reversed and

[a] survey of the

that the defendant never submitted a

(Emphasis

,~:1c1r·c1).

The
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clear implicationofParrish is that a determination of res
judicata (assuming the doctrine were applicable), may be aade
without an evidentiary hearing when the court has the
pleadings and judgment from the previous proceeding before it,
which was the situation in the instant case.
Moreover, it is difficult to see how a copy of the
complete record of this case, presumably including the 5000
page trial transcript and hundreds of exhibits, would have
had any relevance to a determination of the waiver doctrine
issue.

The only critical question was whether the issues

raised in the habeas corpus complaint were or could have
been raised on appeal.

Judge Sawaya did not have to go

beyond the face of the pleadings in reaching his decision on
the waiver doctrine, and thus could properly rule on
respondent's motion to dismiss without converting it into a
motion for summary judgment.

In doing so, he made a

determination of the legal insufficiency of appellant's
claims because relief could not be granted thereon due to the
waiver doctrine.
Thus, appellant's sole reliance upon non-habeas
corpus civil cases iscertainly

misplaced.

Appellant

quotes Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561
P.2d 191 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that, "It is error
to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judqment without qiving the adverse party an opportunity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to present9ertinentmaterial."

Brief of appellant at 12.

Respondent asserts that appellant was given an opportunity
to "present pertinent material" by submitting it to the
court in his petition for writ of habeas corpus; indeed, he was
required to do so by Rule 65B(i) (2).
support his petition with

perti~ent

His failure to
material was an additional

basis for the granting of the motion to dismiss.

Appellant

should not be allowed to demand a subsequent opportunity
to present evidence on a claim that he has failec to state
in the first place.

The court in Spinkellink v. Wainwright,

supra, also suplc' •t-;:.s respondent's argument that appellant's
opportunity to present material evidence of his claims was
in his petition by stating, "Fourteen months is sufficient
time in which to assemble evidence for collateral review
proceedings."

578 F.2d 591, n. 11.

~ppellant

had twelve

months in which to assemble the evidence for his petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the instant case.

(November,

1977 to NO\'ember, 1978, the date hie; appeal was decided
by this

Co~~t

Third District

to

t~e

date of the filing of his

petitio~

in

Coc;~;:).

In concl'"lsion, n•·3f)OnJcnt sub·-nits that appellant
has failed to n•coj:1izc the• unique noturc of habeos corpus
procccdinqs and t 1cC' concomi

t:~r•t

ruJ cs of rroccdurc \·,•hich
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distort the actual mechanics of Judge Sawaya's granting
of the motion to dismiss and attempt to apply the
doctrine of res judicata where it is wholly inapplicable.
As previously shown, res iudicata is generally conceded to
be unavailable in habeas corpus.

Fay v. Noia, supra.

The

two principles of habeas corpus procedure that respondent
asserts are applicable are (1) a special, rigid set of
rules and burdens of pleading placed on a petitioner by
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) the
waiver doctrine (not res iudicata) .

Therefore, the

procedure employed by Judge Sawaya in this case was properly
grounded in Utah rules, statute, and case law.

A motion

to diSHtiss, not a motion for summary judgment, was granted
pursuant to valid authority and based upon adequate information supplied by the pleadings and oral argument of
counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, respondent submits that
Judge

Saway~'s

order granting respondent's motion to dismiss

and denying appellant a stay of execution was sound based
upon the application of this Court's waiver doctrine that
issues which were or could have been raised on direct
appeal may not subsequently be caised in a post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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Moreover, appellant failed to raise any claim upon
which relief could be granted due to the vague and
speculative nature of the claims, and the added fact that he
may not benefit from a retroactive application of the new
case law he relied upon in support of his petition.
Finally, this Court should affirm the lower court's
ruling inasmuch as the Utah death penalty statutes remain
constitutionally sound in light of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, and should uphold the dismissal
of appellant's claim of arbitrary and capricious application
of the death

pen~lty

inasmuch as it lacks legal merit.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT R. WALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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